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"'Cooperation' sounds too much like 'cooption.' 'Collaboration' recalls the Nazis in
occupied Europe. Words are important in labor relations. A word we like is 'jointness.'
Another is 'involvement."' With comments like those, a top United Automobile
Workers official recently pinpointed one of the most significant and controversial
developments in contemporary industrial life - the substitution of a new unionmanagement attitude of condiation and togetherness for the parties' traditional
adversarial stance.
In this paper I shall briefly trace the rise of participative management, as the process
is often called, using the experience of General Motors and the UAW as my prime
example. The phenomenon will then be placed in historical perspective, and contrasting assessments of its desirability and future potential will be discussed. Finally, I shall
try to evaluate some of the more important legal and economic implications of "jointness" and employee involvement in management decisionmaking.
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PARTICIPATIVE MANAGEMENT
During the late 1960s American management became alarmed by signs of growing
alienation and militancy on the part of workers. Although this unrest was much
exaggerated, it fueled efforts by many companies to enhance the quality of work life
(QWL) by increasing employee participation in job-centered decisionmaking. The interest in such programs was intensified during the 1970s by glowing accounts of the
capacity of Japanese industry to improve both the quantity and quality of production
by fostering an almost filial relationship between emplt>yee and employer. By 1980 it
was estimated that one-third of the companies in the Fortune 500 had established programs in participative management. Furthermore, in certain countries, such as Sweden
and West Germany, worker participation was mandated by statute.
Numerous studies attest that it is simply smart business to heed the voice of the
individual employee and to give him or her a stake in the successful operation of the
enterprise. The worker on the production line will spot flaws that have escaped the eye
of the keenest industrial engineer. The mere fact of involving employees in the design
of production processes will contribute to heightened morale, better attendance, and
greater dedication to the job.
Participative management or QWL programs have undoubtedly been used by some
companies as a key ingredient in their union-avoidance campaigns. Nevertheless, several major international unions have become engaged in such projects. In addition to
UAW activity at GM and Ford, major programs have included the Communications
Workers and AT&T, and the Steelworkers and various steel companies. Rather ironically, some experts find that a strong union presence may be essential to ensure the .
long-term survival and continuing success of QWL undertakings.

The GM-UAW Experience

After the fierce organizing battles and sit-down strikes of the mid-1930s, labor relations between the UAW and GM "matured" to such an extent that some critics accused
the two organizations of being "too cozy," to the detriment of the American consumer
and sometimes union members as well. Even the long ten-week strike of 1970 has been
described as a tactic to bring the membership into line. The intense global competition
of the '70s and '80s, however, required GM to rethink its management philosophy, and
to strive aggressively for more efficient production techniques.

QWL Programs
Irving Bluestone, the thoughtful, innovative head of the UAW's GM Department during the 1970s, was a strong believer in greater employee involvement in management.
He was thus receptive to the initiation of QWL programs at GM plants, but he and his
company counterparts were canny enough not to press for them until local leaders and
members were agreeable. The early plans focused rather narrowly on the "quality of
work life." By the late '70s the programs in many plants had evolved into a second
phase, where they were more closely linked to collective bargaining issues and procedures. In a few localities, such as the Pontiac Fiero auto plant, a third stage was
reached in the 1980s, with the parties addressing larger "strategic" questions. All
together, GM and the UAW had plans operating in 50 plants by the end of the '70s,
and in 90 of 150 bargaining units a half decade or so later.
Today the term "QWL," and perhaps the concept itself to some extent, has fallen
into disfavor in certain UAW quarters. Some union officials feel GM has used the
process improperly to bypass collective bargaining and communicate directly with
employees about such matters as the company's vulnerable financial condition.
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GM representatives respond that occasional misunderstandings should not obscure
the very substantial achievements of QWL programs. They have produced dramatic
turn-arounds in morale and productivity, for example, at such once notoriously
troubled plants as Lordstown, Ohio and Tarrytown, New York.
Both parties remain firmly committed to some form of ongoing union-management
cooperation. Thus, the 1987 negotiations resulted in a supplementary agreement mandating a joint committee at every GM plant to meet regularly and deal with the dual
problem of improving the company's "competitiveness" and reducing "outsourcing,"
or subcontracting, whenever feasible.

The Saturn Project
The most striking example of GM-UAW cooperation, the Saturn small-car project, was
described in considerable detail in October 1985 by Eugene L. Hartwig, formerly
GM's chief labor counsel and at that time a company vice president. Prior to 1984,
the company and the union had concluded that the American auto industry's failure
to compete effectively in the small-car market would eventually jeopardize its position
in the rnidsize and large-car markets as well. GM and the UAW agreed to pool their
resources and launch a joint project to build a fuel-efficient, high quality, low cost
small car.
During 1984 seven union-management committees were formed under the umbrella
of the GM-UAW Study Center. Their functions paralleled the activities of Saturn's projected business units, which would be responsible for everything from product design
and parts manufacturing to subassembly and final assembly. The 99 participants included 35 plant management officials, 42 union representatives and workers, and 22
members drawn from<JM and UAW headquarters staff and negotiating teams. Studies
of how best to integrate people and technology at all stages of design and production
proceeded on a full-time basis. Joint teams logged an estimated two million miles of
travel, visiting plants in Sweden, West Germany, and Japan, as well as GM and nonGM plants in the United States. All committee decisions were by consensus, and
ultimately the Study Center adopted a unanimous set of recommendations for the
new Saturn Corporation.
The Memorandum of Understanding that emerged contemplated that the Saturn
workforce would be drawn in large part from GM bargaining unit employees. Management was assured of much greater flexibility in operations through a substantial
reduction in the number of separate job classifications, especially among the skilled
trades. Hartwig emphasized that the nonadversarial "team_concept" would pervade
Saturn's organizational structure, stating: "Most of the authority and decision making
is expected to be exercised at the work unit level, which is an integrated group of approximately 6-15 members." He added, "Never before has a union been involved to this
extent in designing work stations, business and people systems, and in selection of the
site where its members will be asked to work and relocate their families."

1987 Negotiations- "Inverted" Pattern Bargaining
Many outside observers predicted long, hard negotiations between GM and the UAW in
1987, with an extended strike not unlikely. Job security was the key union demand. Yet
the company, its domestic market share shrinking, was intent on greater operational
flexibility and productivity. And GM seemed further hampered by its large percentage
of inhouse parts manufacturing. While Ford already subcontracted out around 50 percent of its auto components, GM produced approximately 70 percent inhouse. That
made any job guarantees much more difficult for GM.
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Ford, currently the most profitable of the "Big Three" auto firms, was the UAW's
"target" company in 1987. Agreement was quickly reached on a new three-year contract. Then, confounding the experts, the union settled with GM so easily that it did
not even have to set a strike deadline. A New York Times writer ascribed much of the
credit for the unexpectedly smooth bargaining to a IO-day trip to Japan that top GM
and UAW negotiators took together earlier in the year. Company and union representatives acknowledge that this joint undertaking enabled persons on both sides to get
acquainted in a relaxed, fashion before sitting down across the table from one another.
With tens of thousands of jobs and untold millions of dollars at stake, however, one
would suspect that there was also something more substantive involved than just a cordial, trusting relationship among the negotiators - regardless of how helpful the latter
might be in paving the way for a settlement. What appears to have been the crucial factor was a deliberate decision by UAW president Owen F. Bieber and other union leaders
not to obtain from Ford in the first round of bargaining any contract provisions that
could not subsequently be matched in effect by the financially more troubled GM.
Ford, for example, could probably have provided an unconditional guarantee of job
security. But GM could not, and thus the provisions in both contracts assuring workers
there will be no layoffs because of such changes as increased productivity (called
"secure employment levels" or SELs at GM) contain an escape clause; layoffs are
permissible if there is a decline in sales volume attributable to market conditions. The
result was to preserve pattern bargaining in the auto industry, but with the new twist of
what I would call an "inverse pattern." That is, the union did not drive the hardest bargain it could with the "target" company and then seek to impose that settlement on the
rest of the industry. Instead, in the first round of negotiations, the UAW kept one eye
cocked toward the future, trying to assess the capacity of the other firms to meet
comparable demands.
As mentioned earlier, an attachment to the 1987 GM-UAW National Agreement established "operational effectiveness" committees at the national and local levels. These
are joint union-management bodies that will constantly monitor work quality and efficiency at each location, and reexamine past outsourcing and subcontracting decisions
in an effort to identify opportunities for "insourcing" and new work within a plant. A
changed attitude evident among GM strategists is that insourcing may frequently constitute a positive advantage, permitting increased control over product quality, timing
of deliveries, and so on. For the union, that attitude bodes well for preserving jobs.
In addition, the 1987 contract strengthened GM's "jobs bank" program. Workers
displaced by outsourcing or productivity will be retained at the same location at
full pay and given training or a temporary job assignment.
The emphasis on job security at GM carries with it certain costs. There was
grumbling among the rank-and-file when many Ford workers recently received profitsharing bonuses of several thousand dollars each; GM employees got little or nothing
despite a similar profit-sharing formula in their contract. GM's management explained
that its employees could obtain such bonuses, too, ifthe company adopted Ford's "lean
and mean" philosophy. Laid-off Ford workers generally remain laid off, and the work
force stands at a steady 100,000. By contrast, GM has recalled tens of thousands of
employees, hiking its work force to 360,000. "If we cut back to 240,000," says one
high-ranking company official, "there could easily be profit-sharing. The unions and
the workers have to make a choice. We think our approach is more humane." GM feels
that systematic efforts to enlighten employees about the economic realities of such
tradeoffs have reduced resentment concerning the lack of bonuses. These efforts have
included a special paid educational leave (PEL) program, which so far has enabled
1,000 rank-and-file employees to spend four weeks in Ann Arbor, Cambridge, Washington, and GM headquarters, improving their knowledge of industrial relations, the
economy, and the political process.
All these cooperative endeavors have not won universal acclaim. Retired UAW international director Victor Reuther (Walter's brother), brandishing the hallowed family
name, tramped the country to denounce "jointness" as a sellout of union members'
interests. He was backed by various insurgents and dissenters still active within the
organization, some speaking out openly and others expressing reservations more
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discreetly. The union's failure to break away from pattern bargaining and secure
the most favorable contract possible from Ford was also the subject of criticism.
Supporters of the incumbent UAW administration's policy pointed out that Walter
Reuther himself had long sought enlarged employee involvement in management decisionmaking. "You bargain for what you can get at any given time," a prominent union
official told me. "Walter couldn't get worker participation, and so he took more money
instead. Today there's less money available, which is why we went for employee involvement." Union leaders are convinced employees can contribute to product quality.
"Quality means sales," insisted one officer. "Sales mean jobs. It's as simple as that."
Over 81 percent of the UAW's members at GM voted to ratify the 1987 agreement. By
comparison, the 1982 contract prevailed with only a 52 percent approval. Learning
of the membership's 1987 ratification vote, former UAW president Douglas Fraser
declared, "The debate [on jointness] is over." But Fraser is an optimist by nature,
and his may not have been the last word.
Within the next couple of years, before the current three-year contract is renegotiated, GM industrial relations vice president Alfred S. Warren, Jr. and UAW vice
president Donald E Ephlin, who heads the union's GM department, are both likely to
retire. What will happen then? A unique chemistry has plainly operated between these
two men, which has been highly conducive to mutual understanding and accommodation. Can the system survive the departure of one or both of its principal architects?
Insiders are divided on the question. One view is that the cooperative bond is still
fragile, and heavily dependent on the dominating personalities of Ephlin and Warren.
Within weeks after the signing of the 1987 GM-UAW contract, the company laid off
thousands of employees, invoking the sales-downturn escape clause. Many workers felt
betrayed and resentful. Someone less committed than Ephlin might not be able, or
wish, to hold the line. Other observers point out, however, that QWL programs and
participative management did not begin at GM with Ephlin and Warren but with their
predecessors. By no~ according to this second analysis, the process has become sufficiently institutionalized to exist independently of any particular individuals.

Appraisals
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Scholars have found precedents for today's QWL, participative management, and other
"cooperative" programs in such diverse sources as the "scientific management"
schemes of Frederick Winslow Turner, the "Scanlon Plan" for providing financial
bonuses to all employees when productivity is increased through the efforts of joint
worker-management committees, and even the shabby "company unions" of the 1920s
and '30s. Some critics have charged that the cooperative or "integrative" model "reflects its heritage," leaving management "in charge but with greater responsiveness to
the needs of the lower participants in the enterprise." Especially but not only in nonunion settings, the cooperative approach is seen as a snare and delusion for workers,
beguiling them into a false sense of complacency about the commonality of their interests and the interests of their employers. Traditional collective bargaining is regarded
as a far superior mechanism for dealing with the genuinely adversarial positions of
employers and employees.
A leading advocate of increased union-management cooperation is Stephen I.
Schlossberg, the peppery former general counsel of the UAW whom William Brock
had the good sense to select as his deputy undersecretary of labor. Schlossberg and
others like him believe that joint undertakings can both enhance the dignity of the individual worker and improve the competitiveness of American industry. Schlossberg of
course would not espouse employee involvement as an alternative to collective bargaining but rather as an integral part of it. Some others who embrace participatory
programs undoubtedly have union avoidance as a prime motive.
An unusually thoughtful and balanced treatment of the cooperation versus adversarialness issue is provided by critical legal theorist Karl Klare. He calls it a "falsely
polarized debate." Placing his customary emphasis on "workplace democracy'' and
"self-realization," Klare maintains that in the contemporary context of burgeoning
democratic aspirations amidst grave power imbalances, "democratization requires the

simultaneous elaboration of adversarial and participatory institutional forms." He further recognizes today's need for shared employer-employee responsibility in "devising
paths to economic prosperity," adding wryly, "Efficiency is simply too important to be
left to management." I would not put it quite that way but I agree with the sentiment.
My major qualification is that labor and management cannot be expected to act over
time against their perceived self-interest. Almost inevitably, there will be fluctuations
in the proportion of cooperation and adversarialness in any relationship, depending
on changes in the firm's competitive situation, employment levels, the health of the
economy, and other circumstances. That should be neither surprising nor alarming.
What is vital is that both sides negotiate with a realistic sense of each other's needs
and bargaining flexibility.

LEGAL AND ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS
Duty to Bargain

A lesson I would draw from the GM-UAW experience and from the whole participative
management movement is that we should seek to realize the full potential of creative
bargaining by shedding as much as possible of the straitjacket imposed by NLRB v.
Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Co. There the Supreme Court accepted a rigid and unrealistic dichotomy between "mandatory" and " permissive" subjects of bargaining.
Mandatory subjects are the statutorily prescribed "wages, hours, and other terms and
conditions of employment," about which either party must bargain at the behest of the
other. Permissive subjects are all other lawful items, including a broad array of socalled managerial prerogatives or internal union affairs, which are often of intense interest to unions or management, respectively, but about which they cannot demand
bargaining if the otlfer party objects. Governmental fiat should not control so basic and
individualized a question as the contract issues a particular employer or union deems
important enough to back up with a lockout or a strike.
Hypocrisy is encouraged, and candor reduced, by the Borg-Warner formula. A
savvy party that urgently desires a permissive subject in a contract can usually bring
negotiations to an artificial deadlock over a legally sanctioned mandatory topic. Experienced, sophisticated participants in a mature, durable bargaining relationship do not
engage in such ploys to evade the law's strained distinctions. If a union like the UAW,
during a period of rapid inflation, wishes to discuss pension increases for retired
workers, technically a nonmandatory subject, the Big Three auto manufacturers discuss them. A vast portion of the Saturn project undoubtedly involved nonmandatory
topics. In those circumstances the law is superfluous. W!lere legal regulation is needed
is for inexperienced or hostile parties and immature, fragile relationships. The time required for bargaining should not be a serious impediment to management's occasional
need for swift action. A sampling I made of NLRB cases during the 1970s indicated
that negotiations reached a deadlock or "impasse" in a median period of six and
one-half weeks. After impasse, of course, an employer may institute its proposed
terms unilaterally, without the union's consent.
Borg-Warner's mandatory-permissive rubric probably reflects an American consensus that there is some " untouchable" core of entrepreneurial sovereignty (and an
analogous area of union autonomy) that is beyond the reach of compulsory collective
bargaining. An outright overruling of Borg-Warner, either judicially or legislatively, is
therefore unlikely. But at least I think it would make for far healthier and more responsible labor relations if the duty to bargain encompassed, as the Kennedy-Johnson Board
declared, any employer action that could effect a "significant impairment of job tenure,
employment security, or reasonably anticipated work opportunities for those in the
bargaining unit." In my judgment that conclusion is adequately supported by the
language, legislative history, and policy of the National Labor Relations Act. The
Warren Court gave qualified endorsement to the proposition, and, despite retrogression
on the part of the Burger Court and the Reagan Board, sound personnel practices
alone would argue that the broader scope of bargaining requirement should
ultimately prevail.
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Employer "Domination' or
"Support"
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At the time the Wagner Act, the original NLRA, was passed in 1935, a major
barrier to effective unionization was the existence of employer-sponsored "company
unions." These consisted generally of joint employer-employee shop committees or
all-employee representation plans, established by the employer and largely confined
to an advisory or consultative role. Later embodiments took on more of the trappings
of independent unions, with their own bylaws and elected officers. But most company
unions received no dues, had no separate treasuries, and held no general membership
meetings. In any event the common denominator was that the employer, subtly or
otherwise, pulled the strings. It was these company unions; and to a lesser extent the
employer-favored union among competing organizations, that Section 8(a)(2) of the
NLRA targeted in making it an unfair labor practice for an employer to "dominate"
or "contribute financial or other support" to any "labor organization."
Does Section 8(a)(2) prohibit or limit participative management schemes in either
a union or nonunion setting? Professor Thomas Kohler argues powerfully that Section
8(a)(2) represents a carefully considered congressional choice of the adversarial over
the cooperative model, and that, at least in the absence of an independent union's consent, the implementation of QWL and similar plans violates the statute. The key in the
nonunion situation is the meaning of "labor organization." The NLRA defines it as
"any organization of any kind, or any agency or employee representation committee or
plan, in which employees participate and which exists for the purpose, in whole or in
part, of dealing with employers concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of
pay, hours of employment, or conditions of work."
In NLRB v. Cabot Carbon Co. the Supreme Court adopted a broad interpretation of
"labor organization" to strike down a joint employee-management committee arrangement under Section 8(a)(2). Committees at several plants met periodically to discuss
production, working conditions, and employee grievances. Yet they had no formal
structure and had never attempted to negotiate a contract with the employer. Nonetheless, the Court found.~the committees' recommendatory function enough to constitute
"dealing with" the employer, and hence there was an employer-established "labor organization" within the meaning of Section 8(a)(2). Going still further, courts of appeals
have concluded that employer committees were "dealing with" an employer even
though they did no more than discuss or exchange information about covered topics.
More recently, courts of appeals have departed from a strict reading of Section
8(a)(2) on such avowed policy grounds as rejection of a "purely adversarial model of
labor relations" and acceptance of a "cooperative arrangement [where it] reflects a
choice freely arrived at and where the organization is capable of being a meaningful
avenue for the expression of employee wishes." In rationalizing their results, these
courts have relied on such technical arguments as the lack of sufficient "interaction"
or "active, ongoing association" between an employee committee and the employer to
constitute "dealing," and the notion that frequent turnover in committee membership
meant the employees were addressing management "on an individual rather than
representative basis."
I have considerable sympathy for Kohler's conclusion that "as time has passed, the
meaning and basic purposes of the Act have been forgotten by the bodies charged with
enforcing and applying its terms." Nevertheless, the passage of time and the transformation of context will almost invariably affect the sensible application of a statute that
is now over half a century old. There was a paternalistic, protective attitude exhibited
toward the blue-collar workers of our mass production industries in the 1930s that may
simply be inappropriate in dealing with the well-educated, often professional or semiprofessional employees in today's high-tech industries. Academic commentators like
Klare, Kohler, and me may firmly believe that the employees of IBM, Texas Instruments, Cummins Engine Company, and myriad offices and department stores are
misguided in failing to appreciate the psychological and financial benefits of organization. But if these workers perversely (and freely) persist in a contrary opinion, and
even couple that with a desire for less formal mechanisms for input to or cooperation
with their employers, I cannot say Section 8(a)(2) is so inflexible that it could not

accommodate them. Naturally, the exact role of the employer in the establishment
of an employee involvement plan, as well as its timing Gust prior to a representation
election?), could be crucial in any legal determination.

"Managerial" Employees

Product Quality and
Productivity

A potential final irony concerning participative management plans is provided by the
Supreme Court's Yeshiva decision. Faculty members who participated effectively in academic governance by jointly determining admissions standards and curricular matters
and by making recommendations that were generally followed concerning appointments and promotions were held to be "managerial" employees and thus excluded
from the protections of the NLRA. Without thinking the issue through, the Supreme
Court has seemingly placed itself squarely in the camp of the adversarialists: Keep the
enemy at a distance, or surrender your collective bargaining rights.
The inescapable logic is that the more any workers become involved in management
decisionmaking, especially at the strategic level (as in Saturn), the more they risk their
status as rank-and-file employees whose concerted activities are immune from employer reprisal. Fortunately, there are some early indications that the Labor Board will
try not to extend Yeshiva so as to deter cooperative programs in blue-collar industries.
At their best, these programs can contribute significantly to industrial peace, one of
the NLRA policy objectives most consistently espoused by the Supreme Court. One
would hope that common sense will ultimately prevail in this area, although Yeshiva
itself must give a person pause.

QWL and other participative management programs, according to one of the most intensive scholarly studies, have had a "problematic history." Some have withered on
the vine and others have failed completely, even after initial successes. Yet there have
been stirring tales of accomplishment in both union and nonunion situations. GM's
Tarrytown assembly plant went from a facility with low morale and low production
to a prize specimen with reduced absenteeism and grievances and improved worker
attitudes, and was selected as a site for one of the company's newest models. A
problem-solving group technique originally employed there in the layout redesign
of two trim departments blossomed into a $1.6 million training program. At a Buick
plant in Flint, a joint union-management committee decided upon the use of semiautonomous work teams to handle production following the conversion of a foundry
to the manufacture of transmission parts. Teams became largely responsible for job
assignments, quality control, individual members' eligibility for pay increases, and
even discipline. Sadly, what may have been one of the most ambitious projects of all,
the involvement of employees in "strategic" decisionmaking at the Pontiac Fiero plant,
with extensive access by them to performance and financial data, has had a disappointing denouement. GM recently announced the discontinuance of the once-popular
Fiero sportscar.
The semi-autonomous work team format has also been used in the nonunion plants
of TRW, Inc. and Cummins Engine Company. The nonunion system functions much
like that at the Buick plant in Flint, except of course that the basic operating rules are
promulgated unilaterally by management. Low employee turnover has been one of the
positive characteristics of plants with such work teams. Significantly, a survey revealed
that 72 percent of partially unionized firms encouraged the establishment of some form
of employee participation plan in their new nonunion facilities.
Whatever may be the union-avoidance motivation for promoting employee involvement, case studies indicate that properly developed QWL programs in both union and
nonunion plants can enhance efficiency and product quality, can indeed produce
"sizable improvements in organizational performance and the quality of working life."
But the authors of one of the most comprehensive studies of contemporary industrial
relations add these provocative comments:
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"If linkage to strategic decisionmaking is essential for workplace participation to
be successful in the long run, a strong union presence and active support for the
process are also essential. Nonunion firms or those with weak unions are unlikely
to develop or sustain this full form of worker participation."

CONCLUSION
The Borg-Warner mandatory-permissive dichotomy, especially as elaborated by the
Burger Court and the Reagan Board, creates artificial distinctions regarding bargaining
subjects which impair the fullest capacity of collective negotiations to resolve industrial disputes and heighten the quality of work life. Unions should at least be entitled to
bargain about management decisions that adversely affect job security or employment
opportunities. At the same time, the NLRA should be interpreted (or amended if necessary) to permit new modes of cooperative employer-employee relationships, in either
union or nonunion settings, as long as workers choose them freely and without any kind
of employer coercion.
The evidence of various case studies indicates that employee involvement in management decisionmaking, if properly structured, is beneficial for all concerned. It
enhances workers' morale and sense of personal fulfillment, and it improves the quality
of their working lives. Employers achieve increased productivity, higher quality output,
and hence greater competitiveness in the global market. Still another beneficiary of
participative management is the American consumer. Our labor laws should facilitate
and not impede such a salutary process.
Theodore 1 St. Antoine, the James E . and
Sarah A. Degan Professor of Law, is a
graduate of Fordham College and the University of Michigan Law School. He is
known for his writing in the field of labor
relations and his extensive and important
labor arbitration. He began his academic
career at Michigan in 1965, and served as
dean from 1971to1978.
GM and UAW logos used with permission.

54

